Criticism of Ziemkiewicz. Criticism of realism?

After a long reflection, I admit that PZL P 43 can be called Karas, although in fact he was called Czajka, or Seagull. Similarly, upon reflection, I do not recommend the item “Prototypes of combat aircraft and aviation plants. Poland 1930-1939” by Edward Malak. There is no clear thought behind the Author, no synthetic presentation of the fundamental problems. This is my series about fighters that presents the issues better. In the sense – against the background of foreign countries, basic qualitative and quantitative issues, etc. Malak floods the reader with speculations aimed at whitewashing the then activists, including gene Rayski, whose negative role is beyond doubt today. The various exposures, testimonies and memories made after 1939 were not sufficiently exploited, and then some people were throwing mud on themselves while whitening themselves. Rayski massacred the entire sanation.

Stanisław Żerko in an interesting article: Józef Beck’s policy in a distorted mirror http://www.iz.poznan.pl/news/1086_Polityka_Becka.pdf accuses Ziemkiewicz of random reading. Well, but there is nothing to read, even if you burst. I will not recommend anything complete describing the issues of the defense industry and airplanes here. Because there is no. The concept of building an industry was wrong. No – that it is right, in principle, only distortions are bad. She was wrong.
Industry was to reach production capacity 6 months after mobilization, that is in 1939 reality at the end of February 1940. For this to be possible, the following unreal events would have to happen:

1. The course of the war should be similar to that of the First World War in the west: positional, with fixed fronts, trenches, etc.
2. Bomber aviation should not exist. And there was.

I see that the collective surprised the collective by the comparison of PZL 37 “Łoś” with Pendolino. They require the entire system to run:

1. Moose: plane-bombs-fuel-airport.
2. Pendolino: train-track-power (electricity)-traffic management.

Imagine that Moose got engines from a torpedo boat – low-ceiling (torpedo planes fly low to drop the torpedo). Because they calculated that it is possible to successfully hit from at most 3 kilometers in height. But at 3 kilometers, the Moose will be an easy target for anti-aircraft artillery and what? It should fly 5 kilometers, but then it will miss. Additionally, for the Łoś project to make sense, the war must be like the first: permanent fronts, trenches, etc. Only then does bombing factories make sense. In the conditions of September 1939, the bombing of factories did not make sense because the Wermacht was still based on stocks and not on production.

I
I now turn to the basic ideas contained in the article by Stanisław Żerko. They are there and they are right:

(…) even a historian who condemns alternative considerations himself, often unconsciously – like Molière’s Mr. Jourdain – uses alternative considerations. The claim that a decision was right presupposes that the evaluator subjected the evaluator to at least a cursory analysis of other solutions at stake.

I have been banging these on various empty heads for years and it doesn’t reach me. Maybe he will arrive now. I must admit that I myself am the author of alternative theses, for example:

1. If Poland in the 1920s was realistically preparing for defense, it would have had a chance to repel Germany in 1939.
2. But if we find that we have no chance, we give up and what do we care about the fate of the world, the Earth, the Galaxy, the Universe etc. Let them fight.

II
The key to understanding the present polemic battle is the observation that I have already made: we have 3 fanatical-blind parties: frankons, germanophiles and commies. And an additional 3 anti-Russian factions: anti-Russian, anti-sikop and anti-Western. All of these overlap, but no one thinks about Poland’s interests. For example, I do not know whether this Studnicki was so forward-looking, or whether he was following his ideological line – his fascination with Germany – without reflection. And I will not find out because someone will say? Well, he won’t. Part of the criticism here also has a polonophobic genesis: it is furious to be guided by the interests of Poles.

But ad article: we have an unintentional intellectual crisis of Polish society outlined there: one time the Sanacja turned them into a superpower myth, and two times – it led to the anarchy of the opposition. And there is no solution either they had to lead us to our ruin, or the others after the coup. And the topic of the plans for the coup in Poland has not yet been investigated by the so-called professional historians, why not?

As I have already mentioned, it is obvious that in 1939 England and France had no, no – I repeat to the carnivore, still in the fumes of mindless fury – the possibility of really influencing the situation in Central Europe. And in that sense, the guarantees were a bluff. After Munich, the credibility of England and France was, moreover, zero-level: to allegedly save peace, they sacrificed Czechoslovakia, or maybe they would give a good will and give something back? Manchester could return to Hitler as a sign of goodwill. United is enough, City let them stay there. But no. They will not give theirs. I have already written about the political philosophy of England: once that it is anti-Polish, two that the Curzon line is desirable, three that they thought that they would send 2-3 diplomats and they would all fall into the snout before them. And Hitler did not and Stalin did not, that is, the British power decreased to zero. I would also like to remind you that at the beginning of 1939, the defeat of Poland did not change anything in calculations – and so the Germans would have to keep the army on the border with the Soviet Union, for cover. Only Ribbentrop-Molotov brought a surprise here, but it was too late. In the long term, this pact was beneficial for England, because it opened the field for the Germany-Russia conflict (and in such terms they thought).

III
The second most important thesis is that we cannot judge the then from the perspective of today’s knowledge. It’s just that the famous heralds of this thesis usually immediately pass to the Holocaust dazzling, which supposedly was to be taken for granted in 1939. As was so obvious, why this whole ship with Jews was returned from England and the USA to Germany? Ziemkiewicz writes about him, but not in a book. And did England act with the awareness of the Holocaust when signing the maritime treaty with the Second Reich and accepting German armaments? Yes or no? And consent to the remilitarization of the Rhineland? Karnowszczyzna knows what he is writing about?
Anyway, if Poland repelled Hitler in 1939, it wouldn’t be this holocaust at all. And what did the world Jewish community do to save the Jewish community? And it had the following options: opening credit lines, transfer of modern technologies, sale of fighters.

To sum up:
The article by Stanisław Żerko (blog http://stanislawzerko.salon24.pl/) is worth reading by the carnivore so that she knows what to cling to. However, the image of the relations presented in it leaves room for discussion and clarification of the controversy. Yes, Ziemkiewicz may present some topics superficially, but the reality was worse than he presents, not better. On the other hand, I am fascinated by understanding how solutions that have no chance of being implemented pass. Gierkowszczyzna in the past and now. Sick prestige plunging.
CDN

Number of views:
1